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A vast body of research has proven the correlation between exclusionary discipline (out-
of-school suspensions and expulsions) and student outcomes such as lower test scores, dropout, 
grade retention, and involvement in the juvenile justice system, but there is no consensus on the 
causal impacts of exclusionary discipline. This study uses six years of de-identified 
demographic, achievement, and disciplinary data from all K-12 public schools in Arkansas to 
estimate the causal relationship. We conduct dynamic panel data models incorporating student 
fixed effects using Anderson-Hsiao (1981) estimation. We find, counter-intuitively, a null to 
positive impact of out-of-school suspensions on test scores. Therefore, while policymakers may 
have other reasons to limit exclusionary discipline, we should not expect academic gains to 
follow.  
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There is much discussion in the United States education community about high rates of 
exclusionary discipline such as suspensions and expulsions for students in elementary and 
secondary schools (Bowditch, 1993; Marchbanks, Blake, Smith, Seibert, & Carmichael, 2014, 
Rausch & Skiba, 2005; Skiba, Peterson, & Williams, 1997). Moreover, there is concern about 
substantial disparities in rates of suspension or expulsion between white students and students of 
color (Anderson & Ritter, 2015; Anderson & Ritter, 2016; Anyon et al., 2014; Losen, Hodson, 
Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Sartain et al., 2015; Skiba et al., 2014; 
Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; Welch & Payne, 2010). 
Exclusionary discipline is associated with several negative student outcomes including 
lower academic achievement (Arcia, 2006; Beck & Muschkin, 2012; Cobb-Clark, 
Kassenboehmer, Le, McVicar, & Zhang, 2015; Raffaele-Mendez, Knoff, & Ferror, 2002; 
Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Rausch & Skiba, 2005; Skiba & Rausch, 2004;), school drop-out and 
grade retention (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; American Psychological Association, 
2008; Balfanz et al., 2014; Cobb-Clark et al., 2015; Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, & Rock, 1986; 
Fabelo et al., 2011; Gregory and Weinstein, 2008; Krezmien, Leone, & Achilles, 2006; 
Marchbanks et al., 2014; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Raffaele-Mendez and Sanders, 1981; Rodney, 
Crafter, Rodney, & Mupier, 1999; Stearns and Glennie, 2006; Wald and Kurlaendar, 2003), and 
involvement in the juvenile justice system (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; Balfanz et 
al., 2003; Fabelo et al., 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, & Valentine, 2009). If these 
relationships are causal rather than simply correlational, the economic impact could be great. 
Marchbanks et al. (2014), for example, using data on three cohorts of Texas seventh grade 
students in 2000-01 to 2002-03, estimated that grade retentions associated with discipline cost 
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the state of Texas about $76 million per year. Further, school suspension may predict higher 
rates of misbehavior, anti-social behavior, and subsequent suspensions (Balfanz et al., 2014; 
Costenbader & Markson, 1998; Hemphill, Toumbourou, Herrenkohl, McMorris, & Catalonao, 
2006; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Tobin, Sugai, & Colvin, 1996). 
Lower academic achievement could be a result of suspensions and other learning time 
lost (Davis & Jordan, 1994; Public Agenda, 2004; Scott & Barrett, 2004), which is consistent 
with findings that increased opportunity for learning is associated with high achievement and 
large achievement gains (Brophy, 1988; Brophy & Good, 1986; Carter, 1984; Cooley & 
Leinhardt, 1980; Fisher et al., 1981; Greenwood, Horton, & Utley, 2002; Hattie, 2002; Reynolds 
& Walberg, 1991; Stalling, Cory, Fairweather, & Needels, 1978; Wang et al., 1997). This 
argument is consistent with studies that find suspensions precede lower performance (Balfanz et 
al., 2014; Cobb-Clark et al., 2015, McIntosh et al., 2008; Rausch & Skiba, 2005).  
For example, Balfanz et al. (2014) examined the connection between receiving an out-of-
school suspension in ninth grade and later high school and post-secondary outcomes in Florida. 
In this descriptive work, even after controlling for demographics, attendance, and course 
performance, suspensions in ninth grade were associated with suspension in the future, later 
course failures, and chronic absenteeism. Suspensions may predict future suspensions if certain 
students are viewed by school employees as “frequent flyers” (Greene, 2008; Kennedy-Lewis, 
Murphy, & Grosland, 2014), “problem students” or “bad kids” (Collins, 2011; Pifer, 2000; 
Weismann, 2015), and this presumption of an inherent discipline issue harms interactions 
between students and teachers (Kennedy-Lewis et al., 2014).  
However, misbehavior and suspensions do not always precede lower academic 
achievement. Several studies have found that low academic performance predicts a variety of 
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undesirable behaviors in the future (Arcia, 2006; Choi 2007; Miles & Stipek 2006; McIntosh et 
al., 2008). For example, Miles and Stipek (2006) find that poor literacy achievement in the first 
and third grades predicted relatively high aggressive behavior in the third and fifth grades. Choi 
(2007) found that grade point averages predicted delinquent offenses, substance abuse, gang 
initiation, and sexual activity across all racial groups. This could be due to decreased engagement 
or bond with the school (Hawkins, Smith, & Catalano, 2004). Further, Arcia (2006) matched a 
group of suspended students to similar non-suspended peers and found the suspended students 
had lower pre-suspension achievement (Arcia, 2006). 
The literature described thus far indicates many potential relationships between 
exclusionary discipline and student academic outcomes, but there is ambiguity about the actual 
causal link, and in what direction this link may occur. Therefore, the ability to direct public 
policy based on these correlational studies is limited. However, despite the ambiguity 
surrounding the causal relationship, many school districts and states are moving away from 
exclusionary discipline towards less punitive consequences. As of May 2015, 22 states and the 
District of Columbia had revised laws to “require or encourage schools to: limit the use of 
exclusionary discipline practices; implement supportive (that is, non-punitive) discipline 
strategies; and provide support services such as counseling, dropout prevention, and guidance 
services for at-risk students” (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2016, p. 44). Further, as of the 2015–16 school 
year, 23 of the nation’s 100 largest school districts had changed policies to require non-punitive 
discipline strategies and/or limit suspension use (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2016). 
The move away from exclusionary discipline appears to presume a causal effect of 
exclusionary discipline on these student outcomes, yet prior work is only correlational. 
Policymakers and school leaders would benefit from more rigorous, causal research on the effect 
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of exclusionary discipline on student outcomes in order to make government and school policies 
more effective. This is no easy task, however, because of the potential for reverse causality. That 
is, it is unclear whether disciplinary issues precede and “cause” poor student achievement, or the 
declining achievement of a struggling student and the associated disengagement from school 
leads to disciplinary problems. Another plausible chain of events is that a negative shock outside 
of the school setting causes simultaneous problems with both behavior and academic 
achievement at school. Thus, while the data appear to show that academic achievement and 
school discipline are related, sorting out the causality is a far more complicated task.  
In this study, we attempt to estimate the impact of out-of-school suspension on future 
academic achievement.  
The main research questions guiding this study are: 
1. What is the impact of out-of-school suspension on academic achievement in reading and 
math in the following year? 
2. Do out-of-school suspensions affect academic achievement of certain subgroups 
differently (e.g. males and females, white and non-white students, free and reduced price 
lunch (FRL) eligible and non-eligible students, special and regular education students, 
lower and higher performing students, and students in elementary or higher grades)? 
These research questions are limited but also an important first step toward identifying a 
causal impact of out-of-school suspensions on student outcomes. Academic achievement, in 
terms of performance on tests, is only one outcome that school disciplinary policies might affect. 
Suspensions are also associated with increased risk of drop-out and reduced on-time graduation 
rates (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2013; American Psychological Association, 2008; 
Balfanz et al., 2014; Cobb-Clark et al., 2015; Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, & Rock, 1986; Fabelo et 
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al., 2011; Gregory and Weinstein, 2008; Krezmien, Leone, & Achilles, 2006; Marchbanks et al., 
2014; Raffaele-Mendez, 2003; Raffaele-Mendez and Sanders, 1981; Rodney, Crafter, Rodney, & 
Mupier, 1999; Stearns and Glennie, 2006; Wald and Kurlaendar, 2003). Therefore, while this 
study will not examine all possible impacts of exclusionary discipline, it will provide evidence 
on at least two measures of academic achievement; math and reading test scores. 
We focus on the academic impacts on suspended students, ignoring systemic or school-
wide impacts, but academic impacts may not stop with the suspended students themselves. One 
study found that high levels of suspensions are also associated with lower achievement gains on 
non-suspended students (Perry & Morris, 2014). Others suggest that strict disciplinary policies 
could improve school achievement through the removal of disruptive students (Burke & Herbert, 
1996; Kinsler, 2013). Nevertheless, these studies are also limited by the potential for reverse 
causality or confounding effects of factors that influences both school achievement and behavior.  
Regardless of these limitations, this work is an important first step to move beyond 
correlational studies and estimate the causal impact of out-of-school suspensions (OSS) on 
student test scores. Next, we describe the data utilized for this study and the analytic sample. 
II. Data and Sample 
This study uses six years of de-identified demographic, achievement (test score), and 
disciplinary data from all K-12 schools in Arkansas provided by the Arkansas Department of 
Education (2008-09 through 2013-14). Demographic data include race, gender, grade, special 
education status, limited English proficiency-status, and FRL status. 
Academic achievement data include standardized scores on state tests in reading and 
mathematics for six school years from 2008-09 to 2013-14. For the school years from 2008-09 to 
2013-14, state tests in reading and math were administered as part of the Arkansas 
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Comprehensive Testing, Assessment, and Accountability Program (ACTAAP). The Arkansas 
Benchmark exams in English Language Arts (ELA) were administered in grades 3-8, and End of 
Course (EOC) examinations were administered in Algebra I, Geometry, Algebra II, and 11th 
Grade Literacy.1 We standardized test scores within grade, year, test subject, and testing group 
(e.g. with accommodations or without) to account for differences in test administrations. 
Discipline data include indicators for 19 infraction types and 13 consequences, the date of 
the infraction, and the length of the consequence. To simplify the analysis, we grouped similar 
infraction types, resulting in only 12 groups.2 The three most common types of infractions, 
disorderly conduct (31.0%), insubordination (25.9%), and other non-specified infractions 
(21.7%),3 and insubordination (24.7%), represent almost 80% of all infractions during the study 
period. Furthermore, 13 consequence categories were collapsed into 7 (in school suspension 
(ISS), out of school suspension (OSS), expulsion, referral to an alternative learning environment 
(ALE), corporal punishment, no action, and other). The most common consequence types during 
the study period were in-school suspension (39.2%), out-of-school suspension (24.1%), other 
non-specified consequences (18.8%),4 and corporal punishment (16.5%). Expulsions (0.1%), 
referrals to Alternative Learning Environments (0.4%), and no action (0.9%) are very rare. 
Disciplinary data were aggregated to the student-by-school-year unit level, so the 
indicators for both infractions and consequences indicate the number of times within a given 
school year the student was cited for some particular type of infraction and received some 
particular type of consequence. These disciplinary data are merged with the student level 
demographic and achievement data using unique student identifiers. 
The analytic samples vary by type of analysis, but, in our preferred models, we excluded 
from our analytic sample students who were expelled or received a referral to an alternative 
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learning environment (ALE) during the study period. We estimate the impact on students who 
are suspended out-of-school, relative to receiving some other, non-exclusionary consequence. 
Therefore, excluding from the analysis any students who received an expulsion or ALE referral 
makes the reference category clearly less exclusionary than OSS. Further, we estimate the impact 
of OSS on a more typical (not extremely misbehaving) student. Excluding students who were 
expelled or referred to ALE for disciplinary purposes removed 4,353 to 8,940 observations from 
our samples, depending on the sample, representing only about 0.008% of observations.5 
III. Analytic Methods 
Our preferred models exploit the panel nature of our dataset, but we first estimate a 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model as a correlational benchmark to compare with our 
preferred dynamic panel data estimates. In the OLS model, the standard errors are clustered at 
the student level (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993; White, 1980). The 
pooled OLS model suffers from endogeneity as the error terms  are likely correlated to other 
explanatory variables in the model due to reverse causality or confounding factors. 
Our pooled OLS model (benchmark) is: 
 = 		
 +  + 
 +
ℎ+	 +	!"+	
 +      (1)   
The variable of interest, 		
, is defined as the number of days of out-of-school 
suspension student i receives in year	 − 1. Although this specification assumes that each day of 
OSS has the same effect on student outcomes, we relax this assumption as part of our robustness 
checks. We account for a student’s behavioral history using a vector of counts for individual 
types of infractions a student committed in the previous year (e.g. alcohol/tobacco, weapons, 
assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, 
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or other). Thus, the data allow us to control for the observed behavior that instigated the 
disciplinary consequence. We account for district time-invariant characteristics with district 
fixed effects, 
, and include a vector of grade level indicators, 
, and school year 
indicators, ℎ, with 2008-09 school year as the reference category. The error term, , 
contains student and district time variant unobserved characteristics. This model also includes 
student characteristics, ", including gender, FRL status, special education status, limited 
English proficiency, and race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and other).  
Despite the ability to control for measures of student behavior and background 
characteristics in this OLS specification, this model does not account for other unobservable 
student characteristics. Unobservable characteristics such as family backgrounds and 
communities may relate to both the students’ risk of OSS and their academic outcomes, so 
omitted variable bias is problematic for a causal interpretation of the OLS results. Therefore, our 
preferred model uses student fixed effects and is estimated using the approach for dynamic panel 
data models introduced by Anderson-Hsiao (1981). By adopting a dynamic panel data approach, 
we are able to relax strict exogeneity assumptions on our explanatory variables. 
The fixed effects model relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption, allowing a limited form 
of endogeneity through time-invariant student characteristics. A limitation of the fixed effects 
approach is that it requires adequate variation (between states of OSS) within individual students 
across time, and even if there is “enough” variation within students, biases may remain if 
endogeneity is driven by time-varying shocks with effects that persist over time. To the extent 
that there are time-varying factors that are related both to the likelihood of being suspended out-
of-school, and to future academic outcomes, we may be concerned that  remains correlated 
with our variable of interest, 		
, even after allowing for student fixed effects. 
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However, by including the lagged number of days in OSS, as opposed to the current number, we 
aim to limit this potential endogeneity. It would only be problematic if shocks that affect OSS 
are more permanent in nature and, as a result, have an effect over multiple years. Transitory 
shocks would not be problematic in our specification. In fact, the Anderson-Hsiao (1981) method 
we employ is valid only under the assumption that these time varying shocks are temporary and 
not correlated across time periods. Although we recognize this assumption may be strong, we 
believe that it is more plausible and less strict than that imposed by simple pooled OLS. 
The fixed effects are identified only for students who switch states of OSS (i.e. they must 
have variation in the days of OSS they receive in different school years). Thus, the estimates of 
interest are not identified using students never exposed to OSS, although all students remain in 
the analysis and help gain precision in other estimates.6 We can consider this a selected average 
treatment effect (SATE) rather than an overall treatment effect (Angrist & Imbens, 1991). 
Therefore, the results do not necessarily generalize to any randomly selected student in the state 
of Arkansas. Although this might seem to be a limitation, the students who have at least one day 
in OSS during the time of our study might be the most relevant group from a policy point of 
view as these would be the types of students most affected by proposed policy changes.  
Our proposed student fixed effects specification includes the same covariates as in our 
benchmark OLS model, but rather than including student demographic variables, we include 
student fixed effects. A basic student fixed effects model would be represented by the following: 
 = % + 		
 +  + 
 +
ℎ+	  + 	
 +  +       (2)  
We account for student individual time-invariant heterogeneity with , which is allowed 
to be correlated to our other regressors through relaxing the assumption of strict exogeneity. 
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With the inclusion of , we exclude the vector of student characteristics " in Equation (1). 
Other variables in (2) are the same as those included in Equation (1).  








																							'ℎ − ℎ( +  ' − ( + !'
 − 
( +  −
																							           (3) 
Equation (3) above makes it clear that ' − ( will be mechanically correlated to 
 − , introducing bias (Nickell, 1981). Similarly, '		
 − 		
(,	and 
each of our first-differenced infraction count measures in ' −
( would be mechanically correlated to  − , as we argued above that 
this variables are potentially contemporaneously endogenous. Fortunately, the bias induced 
through this endogeneity can be corrected by using prior lags of these variables as instruments 
for the first differences. We use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate our impact of out of 
school suspensions (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981). Our 2SLS models are given by: 
First Stage:  
∆		






 + *+∆ℎ + *+  + *+!∆
 + 0122       (4) 
∆ = *+% + *+		
 + ∑ *+--.-/ +	*+∆
 +
																		*+∆ℎ + *+  + *+!∆
 + 045_578945                     (5) 
And k=12 equations for each infraction type 
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 + *+∆ℎ + *+  + *+!∆
 + 0:;9<7     
   for each j = 1, …, 12                   (6) 
Second Stage: 
∆ = % + ∆		
=  + ∆>>?= +∆
 +
													∆ℎ +  ∆?= +!∆
 + ∆           (7) 
A valid instrumental variable requires two key assumptions: relevance (the instrument is 
correlated enough with the endogenous variable) and independence (the instrument does not 
directly affect the outcome, ∆, and the instrument is uncorrelated to the error term, ∆). The 
relevance assumption is tested by looking for a clear relationship in the first stage results. In our 
case, our instruments are relevant by design. The independence assumption is based on the 
assumption that time varying shocks affecting OSS, infractions, or test scores are only temporary 
and so, they are not correlated over time with time varying unobservables that determine future 
test scores. Although this could be a strong assumption, we believe it is still weaker and more 
reasonable than the assumptions accompanying pooled OLS or other descriptive methods. 
We describe our analytic samples in Table 1. The analytic samples are quite similar, 
regardless of the method used, and the samples are quite reflective of the state population. 
IV. Results 
Mathematics Results 
The math results are in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. Column 1 presents the descriptive 
pooled OLS analysis results, which do not account for time-invariant student unobserved 
heterogeneity and cannot be interpret as causal. The results in Column 1 of Table 2 indicate a 
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statistically significant (at the 99% confidence level) 0.006 standard deviation decrease in math 
test scores associated with each day of OSS in the prior year. Compared to prior literature 
showing large correlations between OSS and student outcomes, this estimate is small and reflects 
the robust set of controls for student behavior and background characteristics in the analysis. 
In Column 2 of Table 2, we present our preferred student fixed effects models, 
instrumenting for the endogenous variables. The results of the Anderson-Hsiao model in Column 
2 indicate a slight positive impact of OSS days in the prior year on math test scores (0.004 s.d. 
per day of OSS), significant at the 99% confidence level. The results of this model imply that, 
when we are more able to control for the endogeneity of our variable of interest and identify an 
arguably more causal impact, the effect of an additional day in exclusionary discipline on math 
test scores, among those who experience OSS at least once, if anything, is a very small positive.  
ELA Results 
The results of the ELA analysis are shown in the final two columns of Table 2. Based on 
the pooled OLS model, each day of OSS in the prior year is associated with a -0.006 standard 
deviation decrease in ELA test score. This is similar to the math test score estimate in Column 1. 
The preferred model in Column 4 indicates a slight positive impact of prior year OSS days on 
test scores (about 0.01 s.d.) among those receiving OSS at least once. 
Within-student variation over time 
One diagnostic test of whether fixed effects are appropriate is to investigate the amount 
of variation in the counts of OSS days between and within students over time. Fixed effects use 
only within variation to identify the impact of OSS.  Appendix Table A1 indicates that there is 
almost as much variation within students as across students, so a fixed effects allow us to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity, without sacrificing much in terms of identifying variation.  
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The student fixed effect approach bases its identification only on those students who 
changed levels of exposure to OSS over time. Given that 82% to 84% of students in our analytic 
samples never received any OSS, we test whether the estimated relationship between OSS days 
in the prior year and test scores is different for students whose exposure to OSS varied over time. 
We estimate the same OLS models as in Table 2 but drop students who never received OSS. The 
estimated relationships are similar (negative, but smaller in magnitude) to those seen in columns 
1 and 3 of Table 2 (-0.004 s.d. in math and -0.003 s.d. in ELA). Given that these results are of the 
same sign as the results from the broader sample, we do not have strong evidence that the results 
are driven by estimating effects only for students with variation in exposure to OSS days.  
Testing for nonlinearities in impact of OSS days 
While we find slight positive impacts on math and ELA test scores, it could be that the 
impact of OSS is not linear. For example, longer suspensions may have a greater impact than one 
or two day suspensions, which may be similar to a typical illness-related absence. Further, in 
Arkansas, out-of-school suspensions longer than 10 days are considered expulsions (Arkansas 
Code § 6-18-507), and for special education students, if a student receives more than 10 days of 
OSS in a school year, it may be considered a change of placement, requiring additional 
notification and services for that child (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008). 
To test for non-linear relationships between prior year OSS days and student test scores, 
we transform our continuous variables, 		
 and 		
 into sets of indicator 
variables for whether the student received (in either the prior year, or the second prior year) zero 
days, 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 days, 7-10 days, or 11 or more days of OSS. In each of these 
models, student-by-school year observations with zero cumulative days of OSS during the year 
are treated as the reference group. See Table 3 for the frequencies of each of these groups, as a 
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percent of all student-by-year observations, for each of our four samples. About 95% of student-
by-school year observations in each sample had zero days of OSS in the prior year, with about 
1.5 to 2% in each of the 1-2 days and 3-4 day categories, and under 1% in each of the remaining 
categories. Instances of eleven or more days of OSS in the prior year are particularly rare. 
The overall math results using these new explanatory variables are in the left two 
columns of Table 4, and the ELA results are in the right two columns. The negative relationships 
in our descriptive, pooled OLS models are, as expected, consistent with the results in Table 2, 
but our focus is on the student fixed effects models. The sign of the coefficients for the math 
student fixed effects model (Column 2) are consistent with the results in Table 2 (which included 
only a linear count of OSS days). However, not all are statistically significant. We find that 1-2 
or 3-4 days of OSS, relative to none, leads to increases of about 0.02 s.d. in math test scores, 
while some longer suspensions (5-6 days or 11 or more days) lead to larger (yet still small) 
increases. Given the relative infrequency of high numbers of OSS days in Table 3, the lack of 
significance on the 3-4 OSS days and 7-10 OSS days could be due to low statistical power. The 
ELA impacts in Column 4 are similar to the results in Table 2 (positive in magnitude), with all 
but the impact of 1-2 OSS days statistically significant at the 95% confidence level or higher. 
Subgroup Effects 
We also assess whether the impact is different for certain groups of students. We present 
separate results for FRL and non-FRL eligible, white and non-white, male and female, and 
special education and regular education students. We also present results for students whose first 
test score was above (or below) average for their grade and school year and for observations 
recorded in grades 2-5 and grades 6-10. 
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Table 5 presents the subgroup impacts on math test scores using our preferred dynamic 
panel data methods. Recalling that the overall impact on math was about 0.004 s.d., per OSS day 
in the prior year, we see similar impacts (0.004 to 0.006 s.d.) in Table 5 for FRL students, non-
white students, male students, regular education students, below average students, and students 
in grades 6-10 with no impacts on the remaining groups. None of the analyses in Table 5 indicate 
statistically significant heterogeneous impacts in math. For example, even though there is a 
positive impact on non-white students, we cannot reject (at the 95% confidence level) the null 
hypothesis that the impact for white and non-white students is the same.  
Subgroup effects in ELA are in Table 6. Compared to the overall ELA impact of about 
0.01 s.d. per OSS day the prior year, we find similar impacts on certain subgroups. As with the 
math impacts, we see very small positive impacts on FRL students, non-white students, male 
students, regular education students, below average students, and students in grades 6-10, but we 
also see some positive ELA impacts on female students as well. In addition, there is evidence 
that the students who initially scored below or above average are impacted differently, although 
these effects could just be reversion to the mean, if some of these students simply have 
idiosyncratically low or idiosyncratically high scores the first time we observe them. 
We conduct similar subgroup analyses using the buckets for 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 days, 
7-10 days, and 11 or more days of OSS, focusing, again, on our preferred dynamic panel data 
method. As in Table 5, regular education students’ math scores appear to be impacted positively 
by OSS. Further, students whom we first observe with test scores below average consistently 
appear to benefit, but this result could just be due to mean reversion after an idiosyncratically 
low first test score. Otherwise, subgroup effects do not indicate clear and consistent stories, other 
than that there is only one coefficient (out of 60) in Table 7 that is statistically significant and 
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negative. Therefore, it is just as likely that this single negative impact is a result of chance, and 
we conclude that there are generally no negative impacts of OSS on math test scores.  
Table 8 shows the same subgroup analyses, but predicting ELA test scores. As in Table 6, 
there are generally positive or null impacts of OSS on ELA test scores, with more consistently 
positive impacts on non-white students, regular education students, and students who scored 
below average the first time we observe their ELA score. This last result could be a result of 
reversion to the mean. While we do see two negative and significant impacts of students who 
were scoring above average the first time we observe their ELA score, this could be reversion to 
the mean for students who scored idiosyncratically high in their first observed year. 
Robustness Checks 
 The results presented so far exclude students expelled or referred to an ALE for 
disciplinary reasons during the study period. We conduct similar analyses adding these students 
back in, and estimating the effect of total days of exclusion (including ALE and expulsion). The 
results reiterate that there is not a negative impact of exclusionary discipline on math or ELA test 
scores. Compared to the overall results in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2, (0.0039 s.d. in math and 
0.0095 in ELA), the overall results using all three forms of arguably exclusionary discipline has 
impacts on both types of test scores that are null but positive in magnitude (see Appendix C). 
 In addition, while the subgroup impacts of OSS days in Tables 5 and 6 were always null 
or positive, we find a negative impact of exclusionary discipline more generally (including ALE 
and expulsions along with OSS) on white students in math (-0.002 s.d.) and in ELA (-0.003 s.d.). 
Otherwise, the results for all other subgroups are still null or positive (regression output tables 
available from the authors by request). 
 Further, we analyze, by subgroup, the impacts of 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 days, 7-10 days, 
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and 11 or more days of exclusionary discipline (as in Tables 7 and 8 but with all three types of 
exclusionary discipline, rather than just OSS). Regression output tables are available from the 
authors by request. No estimated math test score impacts were negative. For the ELA subgroup 
impacts of 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 days, 7-10 days, and 11 or more days of exclusionary 
discipline (OSS, expulsion, and ALE), we estimate negative impacts in only two cases and only 
for students who scored above average the first time we observe them, which could indicate 
simply reversion to the mean. Although we found tiny negative impacts of prior year 
exclusionary discipline on white students’ math and ELA test scores overall (using the linear 
specification), none of the impacts of 1-2 days, 3-4 days, 5-6 days, 7-10 days, and 11 or more 
days of exclusionary discipline ae statistically significant. Our estimates of the subgroup impacts 
of prior year exclusionary discipline on test scores tend to be positive or null, so we have 
confidence that the null to positive impacts of OSS are not driven by our sample restrictions. 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
Summary of Results 
We embarked on this study with the objective of generating a better understanding of the 
impact of out-of-school suspensions on academic achievement, in light of the growing concern 
that exclusionary discipline harms the academic progress of students. Our prior assumption was 
that students would learn less when they are not in school. However, it is also possible that the 
kinds of students who receive OSS – perhaps disaffected or disengaged students – are exactly the 
students who would already experience academic declines because of that disengagement. In this 
situation fraught with endogeneity concerns, estimating causal relationships is quite challenging.  
Using dynamic panel data methods, we aimed to identify the causal impact of OSS days 
on a student’s academic achievement in the following year. The use of student fixed effects, with 
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instruments for endogenous variables, produces an estimate that is closer to a causal impact than 
most previous work on this topic. The use of student fixed effects controls for the time-invariant 
characteristics of students, and predicting test scores in a future year allows us to avoid the likely 
impact of contemporary shocks on OSS and test scores in the same year. A remaining concern 
for a causal interpretation of our results is that there may be time-varying shocks to students that 
affect discipline and student test scores over time. Still, with the data available, the student fixed 
effect model utilizing Anderson-Hsiao (1981) estimation is our preferred approach to estimate 
the causal impact of OSS on student test scores, and is an important contribution to the field. 
In general, we find that OSS days have a slight positive impact on the following year’s 
test scores in math (about 0.004 s.d. per day of OSS) and in ELA (about 0.010 s.d. per day of 
OSS). When we test for nonlinearities in the impacts, we find null to positive effects, with no 
evidence of negative impacts on test scores. When we analyze the effects of OSS across various 
different models, there are only three negative and statistically significant impacts, (out of 156 
different coefficients reported), so this could just be due to mere chance. The most consistent 
results from the subgroup analyses are that regular education students’ and non-white students’ 
test scores consistently get a boost from OSS. However, these impacts are generally quite small 
(about 1 percent of a standard deviation at most), so we interpret the results less as an indication 
of positive impacts and more as a rejection of negative impacts of OSS on test scores.  
Our primary estimates are derived from a sample that is very representative of the state as 
a whole, but that excludes the most extreme disciplinary offenders. In addition, the estimation of 
the impact of OSS on student test scores is only estimated using variation in exposure to OSS of 
students who had at least one day of OSS. While this is a limitation, the students with at least one 
day of OSS during the study period are arguably the most relevant group from a policy point of 
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view as these would be the students most affected by proposed policy changes. While this is 
important to ensure comparison of OSS with non-exclusionary consequences such as in-school 
suspension, corporal punishment, no action, or other, these primary estimates refer to the impacts 
of OSS on a more typical, perhaps less high-risk type of student. Even in our robustness checks, 
where we include in the sample the most highly disciplined students (those who were expelled or 
referred to an ALE for disciplinary reasons), the general finding is again of null to positive 
impacts, with any negative impacts likely just being a chance occurrence. 
Overall, the results were surprising to us. While our prior assumption was that OSS most 
likely depresses the academic achievement of suspended students, we find, at least in this one 
state, no evidence that OSS negatively impacts student test scores. Why might this be? One 
possibility is that disciplinary consequences are doing what they are, at least in part, intended to 
do: encourage students to get back on track. It could be that students with many suspension days 
receive additional supports at home to reinvest them in their education, and that this translates 
into positive growth in the next year. It could also be that other school-based interventions follow 
suspensions and precede academic gains. For example, students in Arkansas who receive 
exclusionary discipline in eighth grade are more likely to be retained in ninth grade, compared to 
similar peers who received no exclusionary discipline (Swanson, Erickson, & Ritter, 2017). 
Perhaps students test scores improve if they repeat a grade and as a result receive an extra year of 
math or ELA instruction in a course in which they were previously struggling. 
Implications 
These results are important given the trend toward reining in the use of OSS in schools. 
According to Steinberg and Lacoe (2016), as of May 2015, 22 states and the District of 
Columbia had revised their laws in order to “require or encourage schools to: limit the use of 
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exclusionary discipline practices; implement supportive (that is, nonpunitive) discipline 
strategies that rely on behavioral interventions; and provide support services such as counseling, 
dropout prevention, and guidance services for at-risk students.” In addition, as of the 2015–16 
school year, 23 of the nation’s 100 largest school districts changed policies to require non-
punitive discipline strategies and/or limit suspension use (Steinberg & Lacoe, 2016). Based on 
our results, if policymakers continue to push for reductions in exclusionary discipline, they 
should do so for reasons other than concern about negative impacts on student test scores. 
In fact, recent experiences in states and cities implementing suspension reduction policies 
indicate that these policies might not work as planned and unintended negative consequences 
could occur. For example, Loveless (2017) documents efforts in California to reduce out-of-
school suspensions. The California reforms were of two types: 1) outlawing suspensions in third 
grade and below for willful defiance (a.k.a. insubordination) and 2) incorporating restorative 
justice. While the report argues that this push to reduce OSS use was largely out of concern 
about racial disparities, the reforms have reduced the rate of suspensions overall without actually 
closing the gap between OSS usage for different racial groups. Further, using California school-
level data over three years (2013-15), Loveless (2017) finds that middle schools and schools 
serving high proportions of poor or black students tended to have elevated suspension rates for 
Black students. In addition, Loveless (2017) argues that some educators are concerned about 
declines in safety and learning because more trouble-makers remain in school. 
 Max Eden (2017) reports on changes in school climate in NYC, using student and teacher 
surveys conducted over a ten year period in which two sets of discipline policy reforms occurred: 
one during the Bloomberg mayoral administration, and one under Mayor Bill de Blasio. Eden 
argues that school climate (based on survey responses) stayed relatively constant during 
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Bloomberg’s reforms. Bloomberg’s reforms were two-fold: 1) prohibiting the use of suspensions 
for first-time, low-level offenses such as ‘uncooperative/noncompliant” behaviors or ‘disorderly 
behavior” and 2) setting the maximum number of days (5) for kindergarten through third grade 
suspensions for mid-level offenses such as “disruptive behavior,” shoving, using racial slurs, or 
engaging in inappropriate physical contact. Then, Eden, argues, school climate deteriorated 
following de Blasio’s reform requiring principals to obtain written permission from the Office of 
Safety and Youth Development (OSYD) to suspend a student for “uncooperative/ noncompliant” 
and “disorderly” behavior. According to Eden, following de Blasio’s reforms, teachers reported 
less order and discipline, and students reported more violence, drug use, alcohol use, and gang 
activity, and lower mutual respect among their peers. Echoing Loveless’ (2017) concerns about 
differential impacts on certain types of schools, Eden (2017) finds that schools with high 
concentrations of non-white students experienced the worst declines in climate. 
While issues highlighted in Loveless (2017) and Eden (2017) focus on systemic effects 
on schoold, it is clear from our work that even expected impacts on the suspended students 
themselves may be minimal, at least in terms of student test scores. Therefore, as some have 
argued, the case against the use of suspensions is weaker than advocates have often led 
themselves to believe (Griffith, 2017). We should not necessarily expect better test scores or 
overall improvements in student outcomes simply from reductions in OSS. Indeed, some have 
argued that school districts are changing discipline policies too quickly (Mathews, 2017), 
referring to the changes as “sickening rides on the out-of-school-suspension roller coaster.” 
Still, there could be valid reasons (beyond improving test scores) for school leaders to use 
exclusionary discipline sparingly. Exclusionary discipline disproportionately affects students of 
color (Anderson & Ritter, 2015; Anderson & Ritter, 2016; Anyon et al., 2014; Losen, Hodson, 
23 
 
Keith, Morrison, & Belway, 2015; Losen & Skiba, 2010; Sartain et al., 2015; Skiba et al., 2014; 
Skiba et al., 2011; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2002; Welch & Payne, 2010). These 
documented disparities suggest that the use of exclusionary discipline should at least be 
evaluated and researched further. Perhaps, regardless of the positive or null impacts on student 
test scores, if perceived as overly harsh or unfair, the use of exclusionary discipline could still 
lead to negative school climate or distrust in a school community.  
Where does this leave us?  On its own, reductions in OSS may not be effective, but there 
are non-trivial reasons to reevaluate the use of OSS in schools. However, if states or school 
districts seek to reduce reliance on exclusionary discipline, they should do so while improving 
access to preventative and supportive systems at the same time. School-Wide Positive 
Behavioral Interventions and Supports (SWPBIS a.k.a PBIS), for example, is a framework that 
implements three tiers of supports, with the top tier focusing on intensive supports for at risk 
students. There is experimental evidence indicating that implementation of a PBIS framework 
has a variety of positive impacts such as decreases in office referrals (Flannery et al., 2014) and 
improvement in test scores and student perceptions of school safety (Horner et al., 2009).  
In this study, we find a counter intuitive result that OSS does not harm student test scores, 
which suggests that educators and policy makers should think careful about policies designed 
solely with the goal of reducing suspensions. Ultimately, large-scale policy changes focused on 
reducing suspensions may achieve that short-sighted goal, but without the resources or capacity 
to actually change the underlying behaviors of students, there very well could be negative 
unintended impacts on the school as a whole. While there may be some promising alternatives to 
OSS, it is not clear what we should expect form reductions in OSS, particularly if high-level 




American Academy of Pediatrics. (2013). Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion. Pediatrics, 
131(3). 
American Psychological Association. (2008). Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? 
An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations. American Psychologist, 63(9), 852-862. 
Arellano, M., and Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 
58, 227–97. 
Anderson, T. W., and Hsiao, C. (1981). Estimation of dynamic models with error 
components. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76, 581–606. 
Anderson, K. P. & Ritter, G. W. (2015). Discipline disproportionalities in schools: The 
relationship between student characteristics and school disciplinary outcomes. EDRE 
Working Paper 2015-08. Retrieved from: 
http://www.uaedreform.org/downloads/2015/11/edre-working-paper-2015-08.pdf 
Anderson, K. P. & Ritter, G. W. (2016). Disparate use of exclusionary discipline: Evidence on 
inequities in school discipline from a U.S. State. EDRE Working Paper 2016-14. 
Retrieved from: http://www.uaedreform.org/downloads/2016/09/disparate-use-of-
exclusionary-discipline-evidence-on-inequities-in-school-discipline-from-a-u-s-state.pdf 
Angrist, J. D. & Imbens, G. W. (1991). Sources of identifying information in evaluation models. 
NBER Working Paper 117. Retrieved from: http://www.nber.org/papers/t0117.pdf\ 
Angrist, J. D., and Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s 
Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
25 
 
Anyon, Y., Jenson, J. M., Altschul, I., Farrar, J., McQueen, J., Greer, E., Downing, B., & 
Simmons, J. (2014). The persistent effect of race and the promise of alternatives to 
suspension in school discipline outcomes. Children and Youth Services Review, 44, 379-
386. 
Arcia, E. (2006). Achievement and enrollment status of suspended students: Outcomes in a large, 
multicultural school district. Education and Urban Society, 38(3), 359-369. 
Arkansas Act 1329. (2013). An Act to Evaluate the Impact of School Discipline on Student 
Achievement; And for Other Purposes. Retrieved from: 
ftp://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/acts/2013/Public/ACT1329.pdf 
Arkansas Code § 6-18-507. Title 6 – Education, Subtitle 2 – Elementary and Secondary 
Education. Retrieved from: http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2010/title-6/subtitle-
2/chapter-18/subchapter-5/6-18-507 
Arkansas Department of Education (2008). Special Education and Related Services: 11.0 




Balfanz, R., Byrnes, V., & Fox, J. (2014). Sent home and put off-track: The antecedents, 
disproportionalities, and consequences of being suspended in the ninth grade. Journal of 
Applied Research on Children: Informing Policy for Children at Risk, 5(2). 
Balfanz, R., Spiridakis, K., Neild, R. C., & Legters, N. (2003). High-poverty secondary schools 
and the juvenile justice system: How neither helps the other and how that could change. 
New Directions for Youth Development, No. 99. 
26 
 
Beck, A. N. & Muschkin, C. G. (2012). The Enduring Impact of Race: Understanding the 
Disparities in Student Disciplinary Infractions and Achievement. Sociological 
Perspectives, 55(4), 637-662. 
Bowditch, C. (1993). Getting rid of troublemakers: High school disciplinary procedures and the 
production of dropouts. Social Problems, 40(4), 493-509. 
Brophy, J. (1988). Research linking teacher behavior to student achievement: Potential 
implications for instruction of Chapter 1 students. Educational Psychologist, 23(3), 235-
386. 
Brophy, J., & Good, T. (1986). Teacher behavior and student achievement. In M.C. Wittrock 
(Ed.), Handbook of research on teaching (3rd Edition) (pp. 328-375). New York, NY: 
Macmillan Publishers. 
Burke, E., & Herbert, D. (1996). Zero tolerance policy: Combating violence in schools.National 
Association of Secondary School Principals. NASSP Bulletin, 80(579), 49. Retrieved 
from http://0-search.proquest.com.library.uark.edu/docview/216029446?accountid=8361 
Carter, L. (1984). The sustaining effects study of compensatory education. Educational 
Researcher, 13, 4-13. 
Cho, H., Hallfors, D. D., & Sánchez, V. (2005). Evaluation of a high school peer group 
intervention for at-risk youth. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 33(3), 363-374. 
Choi, Y. (2007). Academic achievement and problem behaviors among Asian Pacific Islander 
American adolescents. Journal of Youth Adolescence, 36(4), 403-415. 
Cobb-Clark, D. A., Kassenboehmer, S. C., Le, T., McVicar, D., & Zhang, R. (2015). Is there an 




Collins, K. (2011). Discursive positioning in fifth-grade writing lesson: The Making of a “Bad, 
Bad Boy.” Urban Education, 46, 741-785. 
Collins-Ricketts, J. E. & Rambo, A. (2015). The PROMISE program case examples: From get 
tough to solution building. International Journal of Solution-Focused Pracctices, 3(2), 
17-22. 
Cooley, W., & Leinhardt, G. (1980). The instructional dimensions study. Educational Evaluation 
and Policy Analysis, 2, 7-25. 
Cornwell, P. (September 23, 2015). Seattle School Board halts suspensions for elementary 
students. The Seattle Times. Retrieved from: http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/education/seattle-school-board-halts-suspensions-for-elementary-students/ 
Costenbader, V. & Markson, S. (1998). School Suspension: A Study with Secondary School 
Students. Journal of School Psychology, 36(1), 59-82.  
Davis, J. E., & Jordan, W. J. (1994). The effects of school context, structure, and experiences on 
African American males in middle and high schools. Journal of Negro Education, 63, 
570-587. 
Eden, M. (2017). School discipline reform and disorder: Evidence from New York City Public 
Schools, 2012-16. Manhattan Institute. 
Ekstrom, R. B., Goertz, M. E., Pollack, J. M., & Rock, D. A. (1986).  Who Drops Out of High 
School and Why? Findings from a National Study. The Teachers College Record, 87(3), 
356-373. 
Fabelo, T., Thompson, M. D., Plotkin, M., Carmichael, D., Marchbanks, M. P., & Booth, E. A. 
(2011). Breaking Schools’ Rules: A Statewide Study of How School Discipline Relates to 
28 
 
Students’ Success and Juvenile Justice Involvement. The Council of State Governments 
Justice Center & Public Policy Research Institute.  
Fairbanks, S., Sugai, G., Guardino, D. & Lathrop, M. (2007). Response to intervention: 
Examining classroom behavior support in second grade. Exceptional Children, 73(3), 
288-310. 
Fisher, C. W., Berliner, D. C., Filby, N. N., Marliave, R., Cahen, L. S., & Dishaw, M. M. (1981). 
Teaching behaviors, academic learning time, and student achievement: An overview. 
Journal of Classroom Interaction, 17, 2-15. 
Flannery, K. B., Fenning, P., McGrath Kato, M., & McIntosh, K. (2014). Effects of School-Wide 
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports and fidelity of implementation on 
problem behavior in high schools. American Psychological Association, 29(2), 111-124.  
Fronius, T., Persson, H., Guckenberg, S., Hurley, N., & Petrosino, A. (2016). Restorative justice 
in U.S. schools: A research review. West Ed. Retrieved from: http://jprc.wested.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/RJ_Literature-Review_20160217.pdf 
Greene, R.W. (2008). Lost at School. New York: Scribner. 
Greenwood, C. R., Horton, B. T., & Utley, C. A. (2002). Academic engagement: Current 
perspectives on research and practice. School Psychology Review, 31, 328-349. 
Gregory, A., Allen, J. P., Mikami, A. Y., Hafen, C. A., & Pianta, R. C. (2014). The promise of a 
teacher professional development program in reducing racial disparity in classroom 
exclusionary discipline. In D. J. Losen (Ed.), Closing the school discipline gap: Equitable 
remedies for excessive exclusion (pp. 166–179). New York: Teachers College Press. 
Gregory, A. & Weinstein, R. S. (2008). The discipline gap and African Americans: Defiance or 
cooperation in the high school classroom. Journal of School Psychology, 46, 455 – 475. 
29 
 
Griffith, D. (March 22, 2017). Suspensions’ questionable effect on graduation rates [Blog post]. 
Retrieved from https://edexcellence.net/articles/suspensions-questionable-effect-on-
graduation-rates 
Hattie, J. A. C. (2002). Classroom composition and peer effects. International Journal of 
Educational Research, 37, 449-482. 
Hawkins, J. D., Smith, B. H., & Catalano, R. F. (2004). Social development and social and 
emotional learning. In Zins, J.E., Weissberg, R. P., Wang, M. C., & Walberg, H. J. 
(Eds.), Building Academic Success on Social and Emotional Learning: What Does the 
Research Say? (135-150). New York: Teachers College, Columbia University. 
Hemphill, S. A., Toumbourou, J. W., Herrenkohl, T. I., McMorris, B. J., & Catalano, R. F. 
(2006). The effect of school suspensions and arrests on subsequent adolescent antisocial 
behavior in Australia and the United States. Journal of Adolescent Health, 39, 736-744. 
Horner, R. H., Sugai, G., Smolkowski, K., Eber, L., Nakasato, J., Todd, A.W., & Esperanza, J. 
(2009). A randomized, wait-list controlled effectiveness trial assessing school-wide 
positive behavior support in elementary schools. Journal of Positive Behavior 
Interventions, 11(3), 133-144. 
Huber, P. J. (1967). The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard 
conditions. Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and 
Probability 1, 221–233. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kennedy-Lewis, B. L., Murphy, A. S., & Grosland, T. J. (2014). Using narrative inquiry to 
understand persistently disciplined middle school students. International Journal of 




Kinsler, J. (2013). School discipline: A source or salve for the racial achievement gap? 
International Economic Review, 54(1), 355-383. 
Krezmien, M. P., Leone, P. E., & Achilles, G. M. (2006). Suspension, race, and disability: 
Analysis of statewide practices and reporting. Journal of Emotional & Behavioral 
Disorders, 14, 217 – 226. 
Lacoe, J. R., & Steinberg, M. P. (2016). Rolling back zero tolerance: The effect of discipline 
policy reform on suspension usage, school climate, and student achievement. Manuscript 
in preparation. 
Losen, D., Hodson, C., Keith, M., Morrison, K., & Belway, S. (2015). Are we closing the school 
discipline gap? The Civil Rights Project, UCLA.  
Losen, D. & Skiba, R. (2010). Suspended Education: Urban Middle Schools in Crisis. Report: 
The Civil Rights Project at UCLA, The Equity Project at the Indiana University Center 
for Evaluation and Education Policy, and the Southern Poverty Law Center. 
Loveless, T. (2017). The 2017 Brown Center Report on American Education. How well are 
American Students Learning? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Mader, N., Sartain, L., & Steinberg, M. (Forthcoming). When suspensions are shorter: The 
effects on school climate and student learning. Working paper.  
Marchbanks, M. P., Blake, J. J., Smith, D., Seibert, A. L., & Carmichael, D. (2014). More than a 
drop in the bucket: The social and economic costs of dropouts and grade retentions 
associated with exclusionary discipline. Journal of Applied Research on Children: 
Informing Policy for Children at Risk, 5(2). 
Mathews, J. (March 26, 2017). Stopping sickening rides on the out-of-school-suspension roller 






McIntosh, K., Flannery, K. B., Sugai, G., Braun, D. H., & Cochrane, K. L. (2008). Relationships 
between academics and problem behavior in the transition from middle school to high 
school. Journal of Positive Behavior Interventions, 10(4), 243-255. 
Miles, S. B. & Stipek, D. (2006). Contemporaneous and longitudinal associations between social 
behavior and literacy achievement in a sample of low-income elementary school children. 
Child Development, 77(1), 103-117. 
Nicholson-Crotty, S., Birchmeier, Z., & Valentine, D. (2009). Exploring the Impact of School 
Discipline on Racial Disproportion in the Juvenile Justice System. Social Science 
Quarterly, 90(4), 1003-1018. 
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrics, 49(6), 1417-
1426. 
O’Connor, J. (July 29, 2015). Miami-Dade schools eliminating out-of-school suspensions. State 
Impact, NPR. Retrieved from: https://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2015/07/29/miami-dade-
schools-eliminating-out-of-school-suspensions/ 
Perry, B. L., & Morris, E. W. (2014). Suspending progress: collateral consequences of 
exclusionary punishment in public schools. American Sociological Review, 79(6), 1067-
1087. 
Pifer, D. A. (2000). Getting in trouble: The meaning of school for “problem” students. The 
Qualitative Report, 5(1 & 2). 
32 
 
Public Agenda. (2004). Teaching interrupted: Do discipline policies in today’s public schools 
foster the common good? Retrieved from: 
http://www.publicagenda.org/files/teaching_interrupted.pdf  
Public Counsel. (September 27, 2014). California enacts first-in-the-nation law to eliminate 
student suspensions for minor misbehavior [Press Release]. Retrieved from: 
http://www.publiccounsel.org/press_releases?id=0088 
Raffaele-Mendez L. M. (2003). Predictors of suspension and negative school outcomes: A 
longitudinal investigation. New Directions for Youth Development, No. 99. 
Raffaele-Mendez, L. M., Knoff, H. M., & Ferron, J. M. (2002). School Demographic Variables 
and Out-of-School Suspension Rates: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of a Large, 
Ethnically Diverse School District. Psychology in the Schools, 39(3), 259-277. 
Raffaele-Mendez, L. M.., and Sanders, S. G. (1981). An Examination of In-School Suspension: 
Panacea or Pandora’s Box? NASSP Bulletin, 65(441): 65–69. 
Rausch, M. K., & Skiba, R. J. (2005). The academic cost of discipline: The contribution of 
school discipline to achievement. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, Montreal, Quebec. 
Reynolds, A. J., & Walberg, H. J. (1991). A structural model of science achievement. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 83, 97-107. 
Rodney, L. W., Crafter, B., Rodney, H. E., & Mupier, R. M. (1999). Variables contributing to 
grade retention among African American adolescent males. The Journal of Educational 
Research, 92(3), 185-190. 
Rogers, W. H. (1993). Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Technical Bulletin 
13: 19–23. Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints, Vol. 3, 88–94. 
33 
 
Sartain, L., Allensworth, E. M., & Porter, S. with Levenstein, R., Johnson, D. W., Huynh, M. H., 
Anderson, E., Mader, N., & Steinberg, M. P. (2015). Suspending Chicago’s Students: 
Differences in Discipline Practices across Schools. The University of Chicago 
Consortium on Chicago School Research. 
Scott, T. M., & Barrett, S. B. (2004). Using staff and student time engaged in disciplinary 
procedures to evaluate the impact of school-wide PBS. Journal of Positive Behavior 
Interventions, 6, 21-27. 
Skiba, R. J. (2000). Zero tolerance, zero evidence: An analysis of school disciplinary practice. 
(Bloomington, IN: Education Policy Center, Indiana University). 
Skiba. R. J, Chung, C., Trachok, M., Baker, T., Sheya, A., & Hughes, R. (2014). Parsing 
Disciplinary Disproportionality: Contributions of Infraction, Student, and School 
Characteristics to Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion. American Educational 
Research Journal, 51(4), 640-670. 
Skiba, R. J., Horner, R., Chung, C. G., Rausch, M. K., May, S., & Tobin, T. (2011). Race is Not 
Neutral: A National Investigation of Black and Latino Disproportionality in School 
Discipline. School Psychology Review, 40(1), 85-107. 
Skiba, R. J., Michael, R., Nardo, A., & Peterson, R. (2002). The Color of Discipline: Source of 
Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment. The Urban Review, 34(4), 
317-342.  
Skiba, R. J., Peterson, R. L., & Williams, T. (1997). Office referrals and suspension: Disciplinary 
intervention in middle schools. Education and Treatment of Children, 20, 295-315. 
34 
 
Skiba, R. J. & Rausch, M. K. (2004). The Relationship between Achievement, Discipline, and 
Race: An Analysis of Factors Predicting ISTEP Scores. Center for Evaluation and 
Education Policy, Indiana University. 
Skiba, R., Ritter, S., Simmons, A., Peterson, R., & Miller, C. (2005). The Safe and Responsive 
Schools Project: A school reform model for implementing best practices in violence 
prevention. Handbook of school violence and school safety: From research to practice, 
631-650.  
Stallings, J., Cory, R., Fairweather, J., & Needels, M. (1978). A study of basic reading skills 
taught in secondary schools. Menlo Park, CA: SRI International. 
Stearns, E. & Glennie, E. J. (2006). When and why dropouts leave high school. Youth & Society, 
38, 29 – 57. 
Steinberg, M. P. & Lacoe, J. (2016). What do we know about school discipline reform? 
Education Next. Retrieved from: http://educationnext.org/what-do-we-know-about-
school-discipline-reform-suspensions-expulsions/ 
Swanson, E., Erickson, H. H., & Ritter, G. W. (2017). Examining the impacts of middle school 
disciplinary policies on 9th grade retention. EDRE Working Paper 2017-11. Retrieved 
from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952972 
Tobin, T., Sugai, G., & Colvin, G. (1996). Patterns in Middle School Discipline Records. 
Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 4(2), 82-94. 
U.S. Department of Education & U.S. Department of Justice. (2014). U.S. Departments of 
Education and Justice Release School Discipline Guidance Package to Enhance School 





Wald, J. & Kurlaendar, M. (2003). Connected in Seattle? An exploratory study of student 
perceptions of discipline and attachments to teachers. New Directions for Youth 
Development, 99, 35-54. 
Wang, M. C., Haertel, G. D., & Walberg, H. J. (1997). Learning influences. In H.J. Walberg & 
G.D. Haertel (Eds.), Psychology and educational practice (pp. 199-211). Berkeley: 
McCutchan. 
Welch, K. & Payne, A.  N. (2010). Racial threat and punitive school discipline. Social Problems, 
57(1), 25-48. 
Weismann, M. (2015). Prelude to Prison. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica: 48, 817–838. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Second 





1 Most but not all students take the Algebra I exam in ninth grade, Geometry in tenth, and 
Algebra II in eleventh, but we standardize within grade, year, test subject, and testing group to 
account for differences in scores that may be a function of the age at which a test is taken. 
2 We grouped all infractions involving weapons (handguns, rifles, shotguns, clubs, knives, or 
explosives) into one category. We grouped staff assault and student assault into one category. 
We grouped alcohol and tobacco into one category. 
3 “Other” non-specified infractions were coded as a particular type of infraction at the school 
level, but when combined and reported by the ADE, they are grouped into an “other” category. 
4 “Other” non-specified consequences were coded as a particular type of consequence at the 
school level, but when combined and reported by the ADE, they are grouped into an “other” 
category. Conversations with the Arkansas Department of Education Assistant Commissioner for 
Research and Technology, Eric Saunders, indicates that the majority of these other consequences 
are detentions, bus suspensions, parent/guardian conferences, Saturday school, or warnings. 
5 As a robustness check, we also added back in the students who were referred to an ALE during 
the study period and/or expelled during the study period, and estimate the impacts of (in total) all 
three different kinds of exclusionary discipline on student test scores. Details are presented in 
Results section IV. 
6 About 82% of students in our math analytical sample and about 84% of students in our ELA 
analytical sample never were exposed to OSS, so only about 16 to 18 percent of students in the 

















ELA Student FE 
(Anderson-Hsiao) 
Sample
N Observations N/A 1,033,936 660,826 839,542 512,684
N Students 470,362  367,759 275,810 324,033 235,917
Male 51.0% 51.0% 50.9% 50.7% 50.6%
FRL 60.0% 61.0% 60.7% 61.0% 60.6%
Special Education 11.0% 11.2% 11.0% 11.0% 10.6%
Limited English Proficient 7.0% 6.9% 6.8% 6.9% 6.7%
White 64.6% 65.2% 65.0% 65.5% 65.6%
Black 21.2% 21.1% 21.4% 20.8% 20.8%
Hispanic 10.1% 10.0% 10.0% 9.9% 9.9%
Other Race 4.0% 3.7% 3.6% 3.8% 3.7%
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04
Lagged ELA Z-Score 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03
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Table 2: Relationship between OSS days and student test scores  
 
 
Table 3: Frequency of OSS Days in Prior Year, by Sample. 
 
Note: POLS = Pooled ordinary least squares regression. Student FE = Student fixed effects models using Anderson-
Hsiao estimation.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days -0.0060 ** 0.0039 ** -0.0056 ** 0.0095 **
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0019)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y




Lagged Z-Score 0.714 ** 0.208 ** 0.686 ** 0.261 **
(0.0009) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0045)
Constant 0.330 0.403 **
(13.50) (0.0145)
Observations 1,033,936 660,826 839,542 512,684
Number of Students 367,759 275,810 324,033 235,917
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the student level.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
1
PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of infractions of 
each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, 
disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year.
2
Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited English proficiency, 
and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other).
Pooled OLS
Student FE with 
Anderson-Hsiao
Dependent Variable:                      
Math Z-Score
Dependent Variable:             
ELA Z-Score
Student FE with 
Anderson-HsiaoPooled OLS
0 OSS Days in PY 981,242    94.9% 623,586   94.4% 803,270    95.7% 487,989 95.2%
1-2 OSS Days in PY 15,789      1.5% 10,780     1.6% 12,396      1.5% 8,149     1.6%
3-4 OSS Days in PY 17,666      1.7% 12,612     1.9% 11,946      1.4% 8,216     1.6%
5-6 OSS Days in PY 8,141        0.8% 5,811       0.9% 5,150        0.6% 3,539     0.7%
7-10 OSS Days in PY 6,639        0.6% 4,763       0.7% 3,969        0.5% 2,760     0.5%
11+ OSS Days in PY 4,459        0.4% 3,274       0.5% 2,811        0.3% 2,031     0.4%
Total Observations 1,033,936 100% 660,826   100% 839,542    100% 512,684 100%




Table 4: Relationship between OSS days and student test scores 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1-2 OSS Days in PY -0.047 ** 0.019 * -0.0505 ** 0.0215
(0.0057) (0.0088) (0.0071) (0.0111)
3-4 OSS Days in PY -0.0668 ** 0.0126 -0.0551 ** 0.038 **
(0.0058) (0.0092) (0.0075) (0.0127)
5-6 OSS Days in PY -0.0521 ** 0.0319 * -0.0552 ** 0.0461 *
(0.0084) (0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0199)
7-10 OSS Days in PY -0.0695 ** 0.0228 -0.0775 ** 0.0828 **
(0.0100) (0.0162) (0.0137) (0.0242)
11+ OSS Days in PY -0.0842 ** 0.0852 ** -0.0696 ** 0.128 **
(0.0128) (0.0233) (0.0169) (0.0352)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y




Lagged Z-Score 0.714 ** 0.208 ** 0.685 ** 0.261 **
(0.0009) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0045)
Constant 0.393 0.406 **
(12.00) (0.0144)
Observations 1,033,936 660,826 839,542 512,684
Number of Students 367,759  275,810  324,033  235,917  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the student level.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note: Reference group is 0 days of OSS in prior year.
1
PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of infractions 
of each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, 
drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year.
2
Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited English 
proficiency, and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other).
Dependent Variable:            
Math Z-Score
Dependent Variable:                    
ELA Z-Score
Pooled OLS
Student FE with 
Anderson-HsiaoPooled OLS




Table 5: Subgroup impacts of OSS days on standardized math test scores (Anderson-Hsiao) 
 
Panel A: Male Female
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days 0.0040 ** 0.0029 0.0051 ** -0.0006 0.0044 ** 0.0027
(0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0022)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.243 ** 0.152 ** 0.213 ** 0.216 ** 0.245 ** 0.165 **
(0.0051) (0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0059)
Constant -0.666 0.468 -0.441 0.436 ** 0.390 0.378 **
(22.24) (3.445) (10.50) (0.0165) (8.370) (0.0202)
Observations 404,859 255,967 230,981 429,845 336,029 324,797
Number of Students 168,096 107,714 95,494   180,316 140,556 135,254 
Panel B:
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days -0.0033 0.0050 ** 0.0064 ** -0.0009 0.0052 0.0039 **
(0.0046) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0048) (0.0013)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-Score 0.367 ** -0.0259 ** 0.283 ** 0.00912 0.181 ** 0.214 **
(0.0113) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0085) (0.0049)
Constant 0.563 ** 0.312 ** 0.394 ** 0.646 0.726 ** 22.1 **
(0.0470) (0.0115) (0.0151) (12.09) (0.0275) (4.225)
Observations 72,338 588,488 333,836 326,990 129,908 530,743
Number of Students 33,897   247,024 136,869 138,941 128,565 239,462 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Non-White WhiteFRL Non-FRL
Above Avg. 
Math Score Grades 2-5
Grades         
6-10
1
PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of infractions of each type 
(alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, 
bullying, or other) in the prior year.
Note: FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or below avearge test scores are based on the first available 
observation for that student. Grade-level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on 
the grade level associated with each particular observation.










Table 6: Subgroup impacts of OSS days on standardized ELA test scores (Anderson-Hsiao) 
 
 
   
Panel A: 
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days 0.0093 ** 0.0069 0.0099 ** 0.0021 0.0083 ** 0.0145 **
(0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0037)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-Score 0.251 ** 0.266 ** 0.212 ** 0.293 ** 0.258 ** 0.284 **
(0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0063)
Constant 0.520 0.399 ** -4.022 0.700 0.370 0.415 **
(7.620) (0.0296) (31.46) (13.30) (8.029) (0.0239)
Observations 310,955 201,729 176,177 336,507 259,632 253,052
Number of Students 143,427 92,490   81,323   154,594 119,758 116,159 
Panel B: 
Prior Year (PY) OSS Days 0.0101 0.007 ** 0.0134 **ƚ -0.0055 ƚ 0.0085 0.0092 **
(0.0067) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0021)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-Score 0.296 ** 0.0201 ** 0.277 ** 0.139 ** 0.225 ** 0.274 **
(0.0118) (0.0048) (0.0067) (0.0058) (0.0082) (0.0054)
Constant 22.86 0.308 ** 0.394 0.400 0.738 ** 0.312 **
(34.22) (0.0128) (17.28) (3.343) (0.0289) (0.0174)
Observations 54,294 458,390 233,186 279,498 128,568 384,112
Number of Students 28,087   211,684 107,377 128,540 127,284 199,859 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Non-White WhiteFRL Non-FRL Male Female
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically different
1
PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of infractions of each type 
(alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or 
other) in the prior year.
Note: FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or below avearge test scores are based on the first available observation for 
that student. Grade-level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade level associated 











Table 7: Subgroup impacts of OSS days on standardized Math test scores (Anderson-Hsiao) 
 
Panel A: Male Female
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0197 0.0149 0.0327 ** -0.0039 0.0134 0.0369 *
(0.0102) (0.0184) (0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0110) (0.0152)
3-4 OSS Days in PY 0.0154 -0.00290 0.0209 -0.0079 -0.0081 ƚ 0.0538 **ƚ
(0.0105) (0.0202) (0.0120) (0.0144) (0.0117) (0.0157)
5-6 OSS Days in PY 0.042 ** -0.0242 0.0527 ** -0.0192 0.0196 0.0602 **
(0.0154) (0.0319) (0.0171) (0.0231) (0.0173) (0.0232)
7-10 OSS Days in PY 0.0318 -0.0472 0.0227 0.0180 0.0073 0.0527
(0.0180) (0.0409) (0.0202) (0.0278) (0.0204) (0.0278)
11+ OSS Days in PY 0.0785 ** 0.153 * 0.107 ** 0.00894 0.118 ** 0.0209
(0.0257) (0.0635) (0.0278) (0.0451) (0.0293) (0.0404)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-score 0.242 ** 0.152 ** 0.213 ** 0.216 ** 0.245 ** 0.164 **
(0.0051) (0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0059)
Constant -4.560 0.361 ** 1.187 0.438 ** 0.420 0.379 **
(10.11) (0.0263) (11.36) (0.0165) (4.554) (0.0202)
Observations 404,859 255,967 230,981 429,845 336,029 324,797
Number of Students 168,096 107,714 95,494   180,316 140,556  135,254 
Panel B: 
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0331 0.0355 ** 0.0374 ** -0.00441 0.0358 0.0149
(0.0324) (0.0080) (0.0113) (0.0142) (0.0253) (0.0094)
3-4 OSS Days in PY -0.0817 * 0.0514 ** 0.0272 * 0.00293 0.0178 0.0142
(0.0348) (0.0083) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0317) -0.0096
5-6 OSS Days in PY -0.00135 0.0569 ** 0.0542 ** -0.00004 0.134 * 0.0249
(0.0503) (0.0124) (0.0171) (0.0236) (0.0537) (0.0141)
7-10 OSS Days in PY -0.0179 0.047 ** 0.0444 * -0.0040 -0.0366 0.0267
(0.0579) (0.0148) (0.0199) (0.0292) (0.0604) (0.0168)
11+ OSS Days in PY -0.0795 0.0752 ** 0.124 ** -0.00591 0.0780 0.0886 **
(0.0914) (0.0208) (0.0282) (0.0458) (0.0892) (0.0241)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged Math Z-score 0.367 ** -0.026 ** 0.283 ** 0.0090 0.181 ** 0.214 **
(0.0113) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0085) (0.0049)
Constant 0.564 ** 0.314 ** 0.421 2.781 0.727 ** 5.26 **
(0.0470) (0.0114) (7.536) (4.788) (0.0275) (1.724)
Observations 72,338 588,488 333,836 326,990 129,908 530,743
Number of Students 33,897   247,024 136,869 138,941 128,565  239,462 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
ƚSubgroup effects are statistically 
different
Grades 2-5 Grades 6-10
1
PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of infractions of each type 
(alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or 
other) in the prior year.
Note: FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or below avearge test scores are based on the first available observation 
for that student. Grade-level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade level 
associated with each particular observation.











Table 8: Subgroup impacts of OSS days on standardized ELA test scores (Anderson-Hsiao) 
 
Panel A:
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0154 0.0585 * 0.0382 ** -0.00677 0.0233 0.00976
(0.0129) (0.0232) (0.0146) (0.0171) (0.0137) (0.0203)
3-4 OSS Days in PY 0.0436 ** 0.0189 0.0579 ** -0.0168 0.0265 0.0637 **
(0.0146) (0.0286) (0.0161) (0.0209) (0.0159) (0.0231)
5-6 OSS Days in PY 0.0487 * 0.0233 0.0666 ** -0.0505 0.044 0.0490
(0.0226) (0.0476) (0.0241) (0.0365) (0.0246) (0.0369)
7-10 OSS Days in PY 0.0745 ** 0.146 * 0.079 ** 0.0575 0.0891 ** 0.0733
(0.0272) (0.0618) (0.0298) (0.0425) (0.0295) (0.0468)
11+ OSS Days in PY 0.138 ** -0.114 0.143 ** -0.0552 0.104 * 0.231 **
(0.0391) (0.0999) (0.0416) (0.0709) (0.0427) (0.0696)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-score 0.252 ** 0.266 ** 0.212 ** 0.301 ** 0.258 ** 0.284 **
(0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0063)
Constant 0.554 0.427 ** 0.31 ** 0.629 ** 0.416 0.42 **
(9.463) (0.0303) (0.0227) (0.0210) (8.069) (0.0238)
Observations 310,955 201,729 176,177 336,507 259,632 253,052
Number of Students 143,427 92,490   81,323   154,594 119,758 116,159 
Panel B: 
1-2 OSS Days in PY 0.0899 * 0.0267 ** 0.0451 ** -0.0098 0.0464 0.0134
(0.0400) (0.0098) (0.0152) (0.0164) (0.0266) (0.0122)
3-4 OSS Days in PY 0.00240 0.0564 ** 0.0721 ** -0.0111 0.0367 0.0369 **
(0.0467) (0.0113) (0.0173) (0.0194) (0.0336) (0.0138)
5-6 OSS Days in PY 0.126 0.0436 * 0.0925 ** -0.0694 * 0.14 * 0.0300
(0.0719) (0.0177) (0.0261) (0.0340) (0.0567) (0.0213)
7-10 OSS Days in PY 0.136 0.0653 ** 0.144 ** -0.122 ** -0.00692 0.093 **
(0.0841) (0.0216) (0.0311) (0.0446) (0.0639) (0.0261)
11+ OSS Days in PY -0.0950 0.0887 ** 0.17 ** -0.0454 0.125 0.12 **
(0.136) (0.0308) (0.0454) (0.0642) (0.0953) (0.0378)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grade, School, District, and Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged ELA Z-score 0.297 ** 0.0203 ** 0.277 ** 0.134 ** 0.225 ** 0.274 **
(0.0118) (0.0048) (0.0067) (0.0057) (0.0082) (0.0054)
Constant 6.732 0.311 ** 0.470 0.206 ** 0.738 ** 0.316 **
(35.90) (0.0127) (8.481) (0.0228) (0.0289) (0.0173)
Observations 54,294 458,390 233,186 279,498 128,568 384,112
Number of Students 28,087   211,684 107,377 128,540 127,284 199,859 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05




PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of infractions of each type 
(alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, disorderly conduct, bullying, or 
other) in the prior year.
Note: FRL, non-FRL, White, non-White, and above or below avearge test scores are based on the first available observation 
for that student. Grade-level subgroups and special education or regular education subgroups are based on the grade level 
associated with each particular observation.













Appendix A – Within Student Variation 
 
Appendix Table A1: Variability of number of OSS days (lagged) between and within students, 





Overall 1.644 s.d. 1.466 s.d. 
Between 1.370 s.d. 1.265 s.d. 
Within 1.071 s.d. 0.922 s.d. 
 
 
Appendix B – Transitions into Specific Groups of OSS days in PY 
 
 
0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-10 11+
Fewer OSS Days in t-2 0.0% 77.2% 80.1% 83.6% 85.0% 70.3%
Same Category of OSS Days in t-2 97.0% 8.9% 9.0% 6.2% 7.4% 29.7%
More OSS Days in t-2 3.0% 14.0% 10.9% 10.2% 7.6% 0.0%
Number of OSS Days in t-1
45 
 
 Appendix C – Robustness Check to Include Students Expelled and/or Referred to ALE 
 
Appendix Table C1: Overall impacts (comparable to Table 2)  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior Year (PY) Exclusion Days -0.0038 ** 0.0010 -0.0031 ** 0.0012
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008)
PY Infraction Counts By Category
1
Y Y Y Y
Grade Level Indicators Y Y Y Y
School Year Indicators Y Y Y Y
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y




Lagged Z-Score 0.715 ** 0.208 ** 0.687 ** 0.26 **
(0.0009) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0045)
Constant 0.375 ** 0.403 **
(0.0124) (0.0142)
Observations 1,042,876 666,665 846,583 517,037
Number of Students 370,744 278,171 326,672 237,906
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in OLS models are clustered at the student level.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Exclusion Includes Out of School Suspension, Expulsion, and referrals to ALE.
Dependent Variable:                      
Math Z-Score
Dependent Variable:             
ELA Z-Score
Student FE with 
Anderson-HsiaoPooled OLS
1
PY Infraction Counts By Category are a vector of count variables representing the number of infractions of 
each type (alcohol/tobacco, weapons, assault, vandalism, truancy, insubordination, gangs, fighting, drugs, 
disorderly conduct, bullying, or other) in the prior year.
2
Student demographic controls include gender, FRL-status, special education status, limited English proficiency, 
and a vector of race/ethnicity indicators (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other).
Pooled OLS
Student FE with 
Anderson-Hsiao
